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Gorham Mfg. Co. v. F. & M. Weintraub
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. F. & M. Weintraub.
Southern District of New York, May 10, 1912.
1. Trade-mark–Validity.
A mark consisting of a lion passant, an anchor, and the letter G, and being the British hall-mark of the Birmingham assay office, may he properly appropriated by an American manufacturer as a trade-mark, to distinguish goods of his make, there being no evidence to show that the mark was known in the United States, prior to its adoption and use by the complainant as a trade-mark. The use or significance of the mark in Great Britain is not material to the question of its validity as a trade-mark in this country.
2. Trade-mark–Effect Of English Statute.
The English law relative to hall-marks can not be given an extra-territorial effect in the United States to affect a trade-mark adopted and made known in this country as designating the goods of a particular manufacturer.
3. Registration–Effect On Common Law Rights.
The rights of the owner of a common law trade-mark are not lessened or impaired by the fact that he has registered a mark embodying a part only of the features included in the trade-mark as used and claimed.
In Equity. On final hearing. For decision on motion for preliminary injunction, see 176 Fed. Rep., 927.
Messrs. Mason, Femrick & Laurence (L. L. Morill and Hugo Mock, of counsel), for complainant.
Benno Loney, for defendants.
Hazel, J.–The bill of complaint charges the infringement of complainant's trade-mark consisting of the figure of a lion, the representation of an anchor, and the capital letter G in old English, by the defendants, who are co-partners and citizens of the state of New York. The bill alleges that beginning in 1831 the predecessors of the complainant, successive partnerships– conducted the manufacture of solid or sterling silverware in Providence, R. I., and that subsequently the business was conducted by the Gorham Co., a co-partnership, which in 1863 was succeeded by the Gorham Mfg. Co.–the complainant–a citizen of the state of Rhode Island. It is alleged that, continuously and without interruption for a period of 56 years, the solid or sterling silverware of the complainant and its predecessors was conspicuously marked or stamped with said trade-mark to designate the particular kind of silverware manufactured by it; that such trade-mark was at all times displayed upon its silverware, circulars, advertisements, trade publications, and other printed matter as a result of which the Gorham Mfg. Co. became extensively and favorably known throughout this country as a manufacturer of silverware of the highest quality; and that complainant's predecessors were the first in the United States to use said trade-mark upon silverware. The said allegations of the bill are fairly sustained by the proofs.
Complainant's Mark Defendant's Mark
The use of such mark by the defendants in connection with the sale of their products is not denied. The principal defenses are: (1) that the three symbols–the lion passant, the anchor, and the old English letter G–in juxtaposition, form an English hallmark, and therefore can not be adopted in this country as a valid trade-mark; (2) that complainant's marks are not used to indicate the origin or ownership of the articles to which they are affixed, but for the purpose of identifying the class or quality; (3) that a trade-mark consisting of a combination of the figures and letter G in suit is a violation of the treaties between Great Britain and the United States; and (4) non-infringement.
The defenses in their entirety are not only novel, but extremely interesting, and are asserted by counsel for the defendants with vigorous elaboration. But in the view taken of this case, the principal question arising on the merits is whether the complainant has the legal right to enforce its asserted common law trade-mark claimed to have been exclusively applied by it, first to articles of standard coin silver, and since 1868 to those of sterling quality. Had the complainant the right for the purpose of designating silverware of a certain grade to adopt and use the three symbols, the lion passant, the anchor, and the capital letter G, which were the facsimile of a prior British hallmark of the Birmingham assay office? Before dwelling upon the evidence contained in a voluminous record, the general rule may be stated that anyone has the unquestionable right to make his merchantable commodities known to the purchasing public by attaching thereto a name, mark, or device not previously used by another on commodities of the same general kind or description. Such device must be for the purpose of enabling the user to impart to the salable article to which it is affixed an unmistakable characteristic, to the end that there may be positive identification and differentiation from articles of a similar character produced by another. But if the mark or device originated and used by one is afterwards adopted and used on similar articles by another to create the impression that such articles were manufactured or sold by the former, then obviously a fraud or deception is practised upon the public by the latter, such as a court of equity will restrain. Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U. S., 218; Browne on Trade-Marks, pp. 101-162.
The claim of the defendant that the trade-mark was really adopted to identify the class or quality of the silverware and not its ownership or origin is not substantiated by the evidence. Therefore I conceive that the crucial questions arising from the alleged infringement of the trade-mark are: (i) whether its adaptation as early as 1859, as appears by the proofs, and continuous use in this country by the complainant down to the present time were in fact an appropriation of a British hallmark or the essential parts thereof, and therefore not subject to a valid trade-mark; and (2) whether such hallmark at the time of its simulation by complainant had achieved a reputation in this country such as would mislead the public when buying complainant's silverware into believing it was buying hallmarked ware.
A temporary injunction was granted herein by Judge Lacombe (176 Fed., 927) restraining the defendants from using the trade-mark in controversy. The application was heard and considered upon a record which was not materially different from that which is now before this court save perhaps for the interposition of the British government, the arguments submitted by it. and the refusal by the patent office to register complainant's trade-mark–matters to which reference will later be made in this opinion. In granting the injunction, Judge Lacombe in broad terms expressed the opinion that a manufacturer or dealer in silverware in the United States is not precluded from adopting as a trade-mark an impression made up of three marks or symbols, by the fact that placed side by side they would indicate to a buyer of English silverware that the article so marked was sterling ware made in the city of Birmingham in 1831. The learned court said that when the dealer "has used the particular combination on his ware made in this country for upwards of forty years, and the same has been accepted by the trade as his identifying mark, without imitation by anyone, he is entitled to an injunction, at least until final hearing."
In Kaiserbrauerei, Beck & Co. v. J. & P. Baitz Brewing Co., 71 Fed., 695, Judge Dallas decided that a mark of identity affixed to a vendible article which could not be lawfully appropriated for such purpose in a foreign country, could nevertheless be properly appropriated and used as a valid trade-mark in the United States. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming such decision (74 Fed., 222), held that the provision in the treaty with Germany that its citizens living in the United States shall receive the same protection as native citizens in matters of trade-mark, etc., can not be construed to preclude an alien German from acquiring by prior use in this country a trade-mark in a particular word though such use would not be allowed in Germany. The principle laid down in the cases cited is applicable to the case at bar.
The evidence conclusively establishes that from the first use of the mark it was the intention of the complainant's predecessors to make their silverware of coin and sterling standards favorably known to the public by their trade-mark, the lion, the anchor, and the letter G, and that in this intention they have been successful. That the lion passant when used as a trade-mark in England or elsewhere is expressive of superior workmanship or superior quality, and that the anchor is known in England to represent the place of manufacture, and that the hallmark is protected in England by statute is not enough to deprive the complainant of the right to use such features in combination with the old English letter G, as its trade-mark in this country. Sight should not be lost of the fact that such adoption occurred many years since at a time when it may fairly be presumed the Birmingham hallmark was little known in the United States. It has several times been held by the federal courts that a trademark used abroad may be adopted by one in this country in connection with a similar article provided its adoption was in good faith. Richter v. Anchor Remedy Co., 52 Fed., 455. And though British hallmarks are not strictly trade-marks, this rule is thought analogous.
The circuit court of appeals affirming Richter v. Anchor Remedy Co., 59 Fed., 577, held that sale to a limited extent in this country by a foreign "manufacturer did not amount to such use or publicity as would indicate an intention to adopt as a trade-mark the marks upon the articles sold. Thus it would appear that any limited number of sales in this country, before or since complainant's adaptation, of hallmarked silverware assayed in Birmingham, did not absolutely deprive it of the , right to use a similar emblem upon its vendible wares. Hence, the principal questions are whether the complainant originated the trade-mark in this country–the place where the articles are manufactured and sold, and whether after the exclusive use thereof by the complainant for a period of time sufficiently long to give the goods so marked a reputation for fineness or quality, the defendant by their imitation infringed the same.
It is not clearly shown that silverware hallmarked at Birmingham had been imported into this country, or that such hallmark was distinctively known at the time complainant first stamped the three emblems upon its goods. Indeed, the proofs are that such combined emblems are understood in this country as a badge affirming that the wares are the handiwork of the Gorham Mfg. Co. The evidence does not disclose the importation into this country of a sufficiently large quantity of silverware bearing the insignia of the Birmingham assay office to affect the complainant in the prior right to the use of his trade-mark as against another citizen of this country who wrongfully simulates the same and affixes it to an inferior grade of silverware. While it is true that the said hallmark is stamped upon silverware produced in Birmingham in large quantities and sold in Great Britain, yet that fact standing alone is insufficient to preclude the complainant from using the mark adopted by it half a century ago. even though the adaptation bears a strong resemblance to the Birmingham hallmark, despite the omission of the date letter and duty mark which, according to the publications of Buck, Jackson, Cripps and Chaffers, accompanied in the authorized Birmingham hallmark, the three emblems previously mentioned. There was introduced in evidence a silver spur which, according to the testimony of the witness Westwood, was legally hallmarked in the year 1830 or 1831, such mark consisting of the said features without, however, having the maker's mark and duty mark aligned with the principal emblems.
Further discussion of the right of the complainant to simulate the Birmingham hallmark for identifying its products makes it desirable that I should here state that the British government by consul amicus curiac has submitted an able brief in opposition to the claims of the complainant, in which it is requested that it be determined by the judgment of this court that neither of the parties to this litigation can lawfully acquire trade-mark rights in the emblems of the lion passant, the anchor, and the letter G, on the ground that such insignia is the hallmark of the Birmingham assay office. The importance of this question thus presented is not underestimated, and indeed so impressed by it was the commissioner of patents that he reconsidered the application by complainant for registration of the trade-mark and held it to be a simulation of the insignia of the British government which public policy required should be refused registration. The decision of the commissioner of patents is entitled to the careful thought which I have given it. but I am not persuaded by his reasoning that the trade-mark in controversy is invalid. This action is not based on any registration rights under the federal statute, but is brought by virtue of common law rights– rights obtained because of the uninterrupted use of the mark for many years by the complainant in connection with its business, and because of rights prescriptive in their nature and superior to those of other citizens of this country in the said trade-mark, or indeed, as the record stands, superior even to the rights previously obtained by another under the laws of England. The English statute relating to hallmarks can not be given extra-territorial effect to bar a trade-mark adopted in this country and known to the trade as designating particular products of the complainant. McLoughlin v. Raphael Tuck Co.. 191 U. S.. 267; Baglin v. Cusenier Co., 221 U. S., 580; Kaiserbrauerei, Beck & Co. v. J. & P. Baltz Brewing Co., supra. And in applying the rule of non-extraterritorial effect I may with propriety quote the words of Mr. Justice Hughes in the recently decided case of Froman v. Ferris, that there is no "indication of a purpose to incapacitate British citizens from holding their intellectual products secure from interference in other jurisdictions in accordance with the principles of common law." If this were an action by a British subject to enjoin infringement of the Birmingham hallmark complaining that his property right had been invaded, and it was shown that hallmarked silverware had previously been imported into the United States, a different question would be presented for decision. And even in that case something more would be required to establish such right than an importation "to a limited extent upon special orders, to supply particular customers." Richter v. Anchor Remedy Co., supra; Kohler Mfg. Co. v. Beshore, 53 Fed., 262; MacMahon Phamacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 Fed., 468; Teflon v. Tappan, 85 Fed., 774. But in a litigation between citizens of this country it is to me perfectly plain that one can not be permitted to infringe upon the prior rights of the other in a trade-mark bv the use of which he has built up an extensive trade in a particular commodity. True enough, there is evidence showing importations of silverware from Birmingham since the year 1850, but whether they bore the Birmingham hallmark or some other hallmark does not appear. There have been some importations since 1878 bearing the Birmingham hallmark, but according to the proofs they were few prior to 1891, and it nowhere positively appears that silverware containing the Birmingham hallmark was imported into the United States anterior to complainant's adoption of such marking. It is unnecessary to go with more detail into the evidence relating to importations.
The defendants have urged that to hold the trade-mark valid would be a violation of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain, and furthermore, that such a monopoly would interfere with importations of silverware from England and its possessions, but this contention in view of what has been said is without merit. It is further argued, and the point presented for consideration, that the act of Parliament of 1773, relating to hallmarks, was a public act which became operative throughout the colonies and was continued in force by the first constitution of the state of New York. It is true enough that the first constitution of this state provided that such parts of the common law of England, and of the statute law of Great Britain, and of the acts of the legislature of the colony of New York as formed the law of the colony in the year 1775, should constitute the law of this state, etc. But in answer to this contention it is enough to say that such provision, save as to the common law. was not included in subsequent constitutions, and therefore is not now the fundamental law of this state; nor are the English statutes, under which silverware manufactured in England is hallmarked, in force in the United States.
It next appears that the claim of complainant to an exclusive right in the trade-mark in suit was not sustained in an action brought in the Exchequer Court of Canada against Ellis & Co., and it is insisted by defendants that the principle upon which that case was decided applies here. It was not, however, determined in that case that the use of complainant's trade-mark in Canada was unlawful, nor was it held that the statutes of England as to hallmarking, standing alone, were sufficient to preclude complainant from enforcing its trade-mark rights in Canada. The adverse decision was based upon the fact that the Birmingham hallmark had been in use in Canada for a continuous period prior to complainant's use. As to whether the evidence relating to such prior use in Canada was as meager and unsatisfactory as in this case does not appear, but it may be presumed, I think, to the contrary, as the learned court regarded the evidence sufficient to establish the claim of anticipation.
The next inquiry is as to the effect of marks registered by the complainant or for which applications for registration were filed. It appears that the essential features of one registered trade-mark, No. 33.902. affixed to the bill–are three raised panels, but the specification however makes clear that each panel has on it a representation–on the left panel, a lion; on the central panel, an anchor, and on the right panel, the letter G in old English, but that both the lion and anchor may be omitted. But in view of complainant's reliance on its common law trade-mark it is difficult to see how such marks or panels have any relevancy. It is unimportant that complainant has registered other trademarks which it applies to articles differing in kind or quality. Such additional registered trade-marks were not an abandonment of complainant's common law trade-mark, and their registration has not deprived it of right to protection in the use thereof. Layton Pure Food Co. v. Church & Dwight Co., 182 Fed.. 24; Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson, 179 U. S., 19; Loonen v. Dictsch, 189 Fed., 487.
Concededly, the defendants put upon their silver-plated ware a simulation of complainant's trade-mark–the anchor, the lion passant and old English letter G, and although proof of confusion is unnecessary (Gannert v. Rupert, 127 Fed., 962), consideration is nevertheless given the defense of non-infringement in treating of defendants' liability for unfair dealing in trade. It is proven that the defendants, with the intention of diverting to themselves a portion of the good will of complainant's business, have put upon the market and sold a silver-plated ware of inferior grade, but of the same general appearance as that of the complainant's solid or sterling ware, and to accomplish their purpose have used the complainant's insignia or trade-mark to cause it to be believed that their goods were of the same quality as complainant's. When the defendants put their inferior grade of silverware, which has the appearance of complainant's, on the market and then brand and stamp it with the anchor, lion and letter G, a customer acquainted with complainant's stamp or mark is likely to fall into error and to mistake the defendants' ware for complainant's. Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills Co. v. Eagle, 86 Fed., 608. That the defendants intended to engage in competition with complainant and by unfair and dishonest means to divert to themselves a part of its business is undeniable, actual confusion from the similarity of marking sufficiently appearing by the testimony of witnesses Atkins and Falding. The affidavit of Frederick Weintraub shows that the firm used various marks on their silver-plated ware which had been given them by different dealers for whom the ware was manufactured. From such testimony and acts it appears that there was an intention on the part of the defendants to misrepresent their goods, and they must be held to have intended the consequences of their acts. Von Faber. et al. v. Faber, 124 Fed., 603; Devlin v. McLeod, 135 Fed.. 164; Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Doivd & Co., 178 Fed., 73. It is not enough that the defendants sold their ware as silver-plated ware and that dealers were fully aware of the character thereof. Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mills Co. v. Eagle, supra.
Other questions have been argued, but in view of the foregoing they need not be substantially passed upon.
The complainant is entitled to a decree as prayed for in the bill, with costs.
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Anthony J. Schmidt
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Anthony J. Schmidt, et al.
Southern District of New York, May 10. 1912.
Infringement–Evidence–Trap Orders.
Proof of purchases hv the complainant's attorney and by a clerk in his employ are sufficient to establish infringement. where it is shown that other poods than those sold, bearing the infringing mark, were displayed for sale in the defendant's store.
2. Infringement–Knowledge Of Infringed.
Ignorance of the dealer that the mark displayed on goods sold by him is an infringement is immaterial. He must be on his guard against infringing on the rights of others in handling goods sold him by dealers.
In Equity. On final hearing.
Messrs. Mason, Fenwick & Lawrence (L. L. Morrill and Hugo Mock, of counsel), for complainant.
Benno Loney, for defendant.
Hazel, J.–This is an action for infringement of complainant's trade-mark by the defendants who are dealers in silverplated ware, and for unfair competition in trade. The trademark which is the subject of this controversy is identically the same as that considered, and held valid and infringed in Gorham Manufacturing Company v. F. & M. Weintraub, manufacturers of silver-plated ware. A recitation of the material facts upon which such trade-mark was held valid, is unnecessary. The issues are precisely the same save as to specific acts of infringement.
The defendants insist that infringement by them is not sufficiently established, and, in any event, that there was no fraud or deception in the two sales complained of because the buyers, who were respectively an attorney for the complainant and a clerk in its employ, knew the nature of the goods they were buying, and that the goods upon which the trade-mark was stamped were of an inferior grade. It was also testified that the defendants, in addition to such sales, displayed for sale in their store, 40 or 50 pieces or so of silverware which had stamped on them the anchor, the lion passant and the old English letter G. This prima facie showing is sufficient to justify enjoining defendants from selling their plated ware which has upon it complainant's trade-mark. Burnett, ct al. v. Halm, 88 Fed., 694; Lever Bros. v. Pasfield, 88 Fed., 484; Devlin v. McLeod, 135 Fed., 164; Low v.Fels, 35 Fed., 361.
Dealers are obliged to be on their guard when buying from manufacturers, and to a certain extent are put upon inquiry as to the character of the manufactured product, the manner in which it is labeled or impressed, as well as to the packages in which it is contained, in order to protect the trade-mark rights of other manufacturers engaged in the same business. The trademark in controversy, according to the proofs, was used for upwards of fifty years by the complainant, and became widely and favorably known in the United States as an indication of the genuineness of its silverware and the excellence of the workmanship. It is possible that the defendants had no knowledge of the way complainant's silverware was identified, and honestly relied wholly upon the rectitude of the manufacturer, believing that the latter would not trade-mark a product in such a way as to influence customers to buy silver-plated ware when they wanted complainant's ware. But certainly under the proofs, to adequately protect the complainant, the defendants must be enjoined from further sales of ware impressed with the said trade-mark.
True enough, it is not conclusively shown that there existed an intention on the part of the defendants to deceive or defraud their customers, but in a case such as this, force must be given to the presumption which arises from the infringement of a valid trade-mark. Gannert v. Rupert, 127 Fed., 962; Florence Manufacturing Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed., 73. There is no direct evidence that the silverware examined by the complainant's witnesses and the pieces bought by them were obtained by the defendants from the firm of F. & M. Weintraub, but it appears by the affidavit of William H. Schmidt, read on motion for temporary injunction, that the defendant firm had bought "Sheffield Plate" from F. & M. Weintraub.
The complainant is entitled to an injunction, but without an accounting.
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Di Salvo Bros.
Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Di Salvo Bros.
Southern District of Nnc York, May 10, 1912.
1. Infringement–Evidence–Trap Orders.
Proof of sales to a witness who is not deceived is enough to establish infringement, where it is shown that a stock of the infringing goods is kept for sale by the defendant.
2. Infringement–Injunction.
An injunction will be granted to prevent threatened infringement, where goods bearing the infringing marks are kept in stock and offered for sale, though the only proven sales are to witnesses sent for the purpose by the complainant and who were not deceived.
In Equity. On final hearing.
Messrs. Mason, Fewwick & Lawrence (L. L. Morrill and Hugo Mock, of counsel), for complainant.
Benno Loewy, for defendant.
Hazel, J.–What has already been said in the actions against F. & M. Weintraub and against A. Schmidt & Son, regarding the validity of complainant's trade-mark and infringement applies in this action. The defendant besides selling silverware keeps an antique shop. It is quite believable that connoisseurs in silverware when seeing the complainant's trade-mark impressed on what they assume to be a second-hand piece of silverware would be misled into buying it in the belief that it was complainant's production. It is not altogether unlikely that a dealer of second-hand silverware might have in his possession silverware spuriously marked without his knowing it, or having a dishonest intention to palm it off for something different than it really is. It is shown without contradiction, however, that the defendants have on sale in their store a large quantity of silverware, and that upwards of forty pieces of various sizes, at the time of the examination by complainant's lawyer, bore the counterfeit marking of the trade-mark in question. It is evident that the complainant's witness was not deceived by the sale to him, as presumably he was aware that he was not receiving genuine silver, or at least silver of the fineness of complainant's manufacture, yet, as the record stands, it may fairly be supposed that the defendants will sell the spurious product for the genuine unless restrained.
There is no evidence showing that the silver-plated articles in the defendants' stores came from F. & M. Weintraub, but nevertheless, under the doctrine of Gannert v. Rupert, 127 Fed., 962. and Florence Manufacturing Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed., 73, proof of confusion, deception, or injury to any marked extent, is unnecessary, and complainant is entitled to protection from threatened infringement. Lever Bros. v. Pasficld, 88 Fed., 484; Low v. Pels, 35 Fed., 361.
A decree of injunction may be entered, without an accounting.
Source: The Trade-mark Reporter - United States Trademark Association - 1912
Trev.